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Kesler: Galoob v. Nintendo

GALOOB

NINTENDO:
DERIVATIVE WORKS, FAIR USE &
VI

SECTION 117 IN THE REALM OF
COMPUTER PROGRAM
ENHANCEMENTS
1.

INTRODUCTION

Because its boundaries are fixed by statute, copyright law
has had great difficulty staying abreast of the dynamic growth
of technology during the twentieth century. Computer technology has proven exceptionally problematic for Congress and
the courts. Courts are reluctant to go beyond explicit legislative guidance, l a resource which has been scarce and exceptionally opaque. On Congress's behalf, the rapid advance of
technology makes legislation with adequate foresight elusive.
This Note will analyze the holding in Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. v. Nintendo of America. 2 First a background of copyright
law relevant to computer technology and video games will be
developed. 3 Emphasis will be placed on the issues surrounding
exceptions to a copyright holder's exclusive rights and the
enhancement of computer programs.
II.

BACKGROUND

Congressional and judicial lack of familiarity with computers has promulgated much of the confusion in the area of
copyright law for computer technology. This lack offamiliarity exacerbates the difficulties both institutions face when·
1. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 415 U.S. 394, 414
(1974) (the court was particularly restrained because the copyright legislation at issue
was enacted before the technology involved was even conceived). See also Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,431 (1984), rehearing denied, 465 U.S.
1112 (1984) [hereinafter Sony]. MThejudiciary's reluctance to expand the protections
afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme.·
1d. at 431.
2. No. 90·1586 & 90·1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, Allfeds directory)
[hereinafter Galoob].
3. See Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852; 853 (2d Cir. 1982) (Video game
defined as a computer programmed to create user manipulable images on a television
screen. Video games thus involve a computer, computer program & a visual output.).
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called upon to apply or modify copyright statutes to account for
technology far more complex than that envisioned when the
statutes were first constructed. In order to avoid similar confusion a background of computer technology and copyright
law will be provided.
A.

COMP6TERS

& VIDEO GAMES

An in depth look into the operations of computers is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, some explanation is necessary
to understand the manner in which the products at issue operate and in order to determine the applicable law.

1.

The Components

Computer technology is usually placed into one of two categories, those being: "hardware,'" the physical components of
a computer, and "software,"6 which is a general term encompassing computer programs in any of the variety of ways in
which they may be stored. A simple way of viewing the interaction of the two is that the software consists of instructions
telling the hardware what to do so as to accomplish some
function for the user.

2.

Computer Programs

A "computer program" is defined by the Copyright Act as "a
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."s The set
of instructions is known as the computer code or simply the
code. 7 Computer programs must provide for user interaction
and some form of output in order to be useful and manipulable by the user.
Video displays are the typical means by which the computer
communicates with the user. Generally both the user's
4. Hardware is defined as a computer and its associated physical apparatus. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 565 (1984).
5. Software is defined as recorded data, as programs, routines, and symbolic languages, requisite to computer operations. Id. at 1105.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
7. "Code- is further broken down into 'source code' which is written in a language
readily understandable by computer programmers and 'object code' (binary) which is
readily understood by computers. Typically the program is written in 'source code' and
then converted to 'object code.'
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commands to the computer and the product of the computer's
operation are displayed on the video display.
The computer program generates the visual display and dictates the computer's operation. Computer programs have been
divided by the courts into literal and nonliteral aspects. The
computer program's code comprises the literal aspect. 8 The
visual displays, interface, etc., are the nonliteral aspect. 9

3.

Video Games

A video game system is a computer dedicated to the single
purpose of producing a visual output which the user can interact with according to a set of rules, generally with a goal such
as scoring points or staying alive. 10 Video games are computer programs designed to allow the interaction of the player with
the visual display th:rough the use of a joystick or other controller. The video game therefore has literal aspects, the code,
stored typically in "game cartridges" and nonliteral aspects, the
characteristic video display.

B.
1.

COPYRIGHT LAW

History

Congressional power to protect innovation through patents,
trademarks, and copyrights stems directly from the
Constitution ll which provides that "the Congress shall have
Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Modern copyright law has evolved from the early protections
of the Copyright Act of 1790,12 through the Copyright Act of
1909,13 to the Copyright Act of 197614 as modified by a variety
8. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass.
1990). (also included in the nonliteral aspects are the structure, sequence and organization). See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
9. [d.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 852.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Copyright Act of Mar. 4,1909, ch. 16,35 Stat. 1075.
Copyright Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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of amendments, the most significant here being the Computer
Software Copyright Act of 1980. 16
Copyright law "is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. "16 Congress grants limited monopoly
privileges to authors and inventors as an incentive for ardent
endeavor, not as a "special private benefit. "17 Any reward is a
secondary consideration.16 The Supreme Court has declared
"[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object
in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors. "19
The Constitution makes Congress responsible for determining the scope and protection to be afforded copyright holders. The judiciary's role in copyright law has been limited,
with the court acknowledging early on that copyright protection is wholly statutory.20
Such deference is entirely appropriate as these decisions
involve exactly the kind of balancing test between competing
interests that the legislative body was designed to make. "In
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two
questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the
producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will
the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?"21 In granting copyright protections a balance is struck between a temporary monopoly, and the benefit which society will receive from
the products stimulated through such protections. 22
Recognition of the variety of issues arising from the computer market led Congress to create the National Commission
15. Pub. L. No. 96~517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (made significant contributions such as adding a definition of a 'computer program'). See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
16. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
17. [d.

18. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
19. [d.

20. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591,661-62 (1834).
21. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
22. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 37. "Copyright monopolies are not granted for the purpose of rewarding authors. Rather, Congress has granted copyright
monopolies to serve the public welfare by encouraging authors (broadly defined) to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public, being free to do so in any uniquely
expressed way they may choose. [Citation omitted] ... The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
[Citation omitted].~ [d. at 52-53.
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on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).2s
CONTU's Final Report was influential in creating the
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980.
2.

Scope

a.

Expression v. Idea

"[O]riginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" qualify for protection under copyright law. u
It is well established that copyright protection extends only to
the expression of an idea, not the idea itself.26 This distinction
was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.26 While appealingly
elegant, application of this distinction has proven problematic. 27
b.

Derivative Works

Among the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders is
the right to prepare derivative works 28 which are defined as
23. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works, Final Report (1979) [hereinafter CONTU Final Report].
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
25. See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)m,. "In no case does copyright protection •.. extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work." Id.
27. See Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960). "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc." Id. (emphasis in original).
A corollary to the idea/expression distinction is the merger doctrine which dictates that when an idea can be expressed in a single or very limited number of ways,
the idea "merges" with the expression and copyright protection will not be afforded
to either. See Broderbund Software v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D.
Cal. 1986). See also Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 37; Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at
1237. The audiovisual portions of a program are generally treated as expression and
not idea because different programs can produce the same video output. See M.
Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986). However, in some instances
courts have found that the idea, see Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204
(9th Cir. 1988) «at issue were two video games based on karate matches) The court
found that "the visual depiction of karate matches is subject to the constraints inherent in the sport of karate itself." Id. at 209.) or external factors, see Plains Cotton Coop.
Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), rehearing
denied, 813 F.2d 407 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (holding that the structure and organization of a computer program to provide information to farmers about
the cotton market might be dictated by the cotton market), limits the forms of expression and so merger becomes an issue.
28. Subject to §§ 107-20, the copyright owner has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize; reproductions of the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies,
perform the work publicly, or display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1991).
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a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation,
or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as
a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a "derivative work."29
Two cases have helped refine the definition of derivative
works in the video game context. The first case, Midway
Manufacturing v. Artic International~ Inc.,30 involved a board31
placed into the arcade video arcade game 32 "Galaxian" in order
to speed up play.33 Midway held the speeded-up version of
"Galaxian" was a derivative work. 34 The Midway court added
an equitable/economic analysis to the determination of what
is a derivative work. 36 The pivotal factor in the determination was the potential for economic benefit to the arcade
licensee. 36

Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Systems,37 followed a similar analysis. At issue in Worlds of Wonder was the
"Teddy Ruxpin" talking bear whose mouth, eyes and limbs move
in synchronization to its voice giving the impression the bear is
telling the story contained on special tape cassettes.sa The audiovisual work created was copyrighted by Worlds of Wonder, Inc. 39
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
30. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)
[hereinafter Midway].
31. A piece of hardware to be placed inside a computer typically intended to
alter or augment the computer's functioning. The defendant's board replaced one of
the boards in the original "Galaxian- arcade game.
32. Arcade video games are free standing machines containing a computer
system dedicated to running a single game when currency is inserted.
33. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010.
34. 1d. at 1014.
35. 1d. at 1009.
36. 1d. at 1014 (the court differentiated speeded-up video games and speeded-up
phonographs on the potential for a separate market noting, "[a] speeded-up video game
is a SUbstantially different product from the original game.- The speeded-up version
could generate profits which should go to the copyright holder, and the defendant was
trying to piggyback on the success of another's copyrighted product).
37. 658 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
38. 1d. at 352.
39. 1d. at 353.
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Veritel produced cassettes which worked in a similar manner
when inserted in the "Teddy Ruxpin" talking bear.40 Veritel's
tapes were found to be derivative works.4l As with Midway, the
Worlds of Wonder court was persuaded by the fact the product
could only be used in conjunction with the plaintiff's copyrighted product and was trying to capitalize on the latter's success. 42
c.

Literal v. Nonliteral Aspects

A computer program's literal aspects are protected under
the classification of literary works,43 which are "works, other
than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols .... ,,«
The video display of computer programs, i.e., the nonliteral
aspects are audiovisual works which are "works that consist of
a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devi-ces such as ... electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds.... ,,46 Audiovisual
works are specifically excluded from the category of literary
works. 46 There is an established line of cases recognizing that
video games are copyrightable as audiovisual works. 47 The respective copyrightability of the literal and nonliteral aspects of computer programs has plagued the courts and added a great deal of
confusion to copyright law for computer programs. 46
40. ld. (Worlds of Wonder, Inc. alleged Veriters tapes produced audiovisual
works which were substantially similar to those to which they owned the copyrights.
Further, plaintiff alleged the tapes altered the display so as to take "Teddy Ruxpin"
out of the "World of Teddy Ruxpin.")
41. ld. at 356.
42.ld.
43. "[A] computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a 'literary
work.' " Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983),
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
45.ld.
46.ld.
47. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012 (citing Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981)).
48. It is well established that the literal aspects, i.e. the computer code, can be
afforded copyright protection. See Lotus Del). Corp., 740 F. Supp. 37.
The courts have had much greater difficulty determining the protection to be
afforded to the nonliteral aspects of computer programs. There are two competing theories on copyrighting the nonliteral aspects of programs. The first theory espouses that
the copyright of the computer program extends to the nonliteral aspects it creates. The
second theory is that the nonliteral aspects produced by the program are separate
works which are independently copyrightable.
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The fair use doctrine 49 is an equitable rule which "allows a
holder of the privilege to use copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the consent of the copyright owner."60
Section 107 codifies the judicial fair use doctrine and provides four factors61 to be considered when determining whether
the fair use privilege is available
(1) the purpose and character of the use,

including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
uses;63
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;63
(3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole;64 and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 66
There are only two opinioned cases by the Supreme Court
on the fair use doctrine, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 66
As of June 3, 1988 the Copyright Office ceased to accept separate applications for
the literal and nonliteral aspects of a single computer program. Abraham & Wessels,
Current Judicial Developments in Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 275
PRAC. L. INST.!PAT. 179, 182 (1989). "The Office has decided generally to require that
all copyrightable expression embodied in a computer program, including computer
screen displays, and owned by the claimant, be registered on a single application form.·
Id. The Copyright Office left the determination as to whether to copyright the program
as a literary work or as an audiovisual work with the applicant, the choice to be made
based on the predominate nature of the work.ld. ·Ordinarily, where computer programs authorship is part of the work,literary authorship will predominate, and one
registration should be made on Form TX. Where, however, audiovisual authorship predominates, the registration should be made on Form PA.-Id. The Copyright Office did
note that generally computer programs would be viewed as literary works. Id.
49. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (judicially recognizing the fair use doctrine).
50. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
56. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney
Productions, owners of copyrights on several television programs which were broad-
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and Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises 67 Both decisions were based on the four fair use factors provided in section 107. 68 Sony is the only fair use case in a contributory
infringement context.
(1)

Purpose and Character

The discussion of the purpose and character of an infringing use has become an investigation into whether the use is
for profit or nonprofit. 69 This factor is given a great deal of
weight, with a presumption of fairness or unfairness hanging in the balance. 6o Proof of harm or market loss is required
in the case of nonprofit uses. 61 This rule serves the purpose
of copyright law which is to encourage innovation and distribute its benefits to the public. 62 In addition, Harper & Row
examined whether the user stood to benefit by the infringement without having paid the copyright holder the normal
dues. 63
cast over public airwaves, alleged the use of Sony's Betamax to tape copyrighted programs was an infringement in violation of section 106 and that selling the Betamax
to the public constituted contributory infringement.Id. at 417. The court considered
the four section 107 factors and concluded that taping and time-shifting by home users
for personal use was a privileged fair use. Id. at 455 .
. 57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) [hereinafter Harper & Row]. At issue in Harper & Row
were excerpts from an unpublished work by Gerald Ford which were published in The
Nation as a scoop of a soon to be released book.
In a six to three decision the Supreme Court held public interest in the subject
matter did not make the unauthorized copying of parts of an unpublished manuscript
into a fair use. Id. at 569.
58. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-55.
59. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-52; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561-62.
60. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege ..... Id.
61. Id. at 451. "A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."
Id.
62. Id. at 450. "The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative
effort .... But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for,
or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the
author's incentive to create" Id.
63. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands
to profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price." Id. The court applied this test in considering that The Nation had profited from
its use of the excerpts and had not paid the customary serialization fees.Id. This test
is consistent with the analysis in Sony where the court noted the television broadcasters
invited viewers to watch the TV presentations in their entirety for free. Sony, 464 U.S.
at 449.
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Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Discussion of this factor has centered around two distinc64
tions. The most important is whether the work is published.
The court has weighed an author's right to first publication to
be very important and as such unpublished works are afforded a greater measure of protection. 66 Hence, infringement of an
unpublished work weighs heavily against a finding of fair use. 66
The second distinction is between fact and fiction. The
public need to have factual material disseminated is deemed
to be greater and thus use of factual material will weigh
toward a finding of fair use. 67

(3)

Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

This factor is a quantitative and qualitative examination
of the material infringed. Application of this standard has
been a vague investigation of the percentage and importance
of the portions copied. 66
While earlier courts generally held that copying an entire
work was presumptively unfair,69 the Sony court held that because
the public had been invited to watch the entire broadcast for free,
the normal presumption against fair use did not apply. 70

(4)

Effect on the Market

This factor is "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."71 The Harper & Row court went so far as to
64. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. "The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical elem,ent of its "nature."" Id.
65. Id. at 564. "[T]he author's right to control the first public appearance of his
expression weighs against [infringing] prerelease of the work before its release." Id.
66. Id. "[T]he scope offair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works."
Id.
67. Id. at 563.
68. Id. at 564-65. Thirteen percent of The Nation article came from the unpublished manuscript and the article was constructed around the infringing portions. In
Harper & Row the court found that the words quoted were an insubstantial portion
quantitatively but were "essentially the heart of the book."
69. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). "[Wlholesale
copying and publication of copyrighted material can [n]ever be fair use." Id.
70. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50. "[T]ime-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such
a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that
the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have its ordinary effect ofmilitating against a finding of fair use." Id.
71. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
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declare "[flair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied. "72 Fair use can be
negated not only by showing actual harm but by showing an
adverse affect to potential markets73 or to markets for derivative works. 74 Indeed a plaintiff must only "show[] by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of
future harm exists" to bar a finding of fair use. 76
The relevant inquiry is whether the use "supplants any part
of the normal market for a copyrighted work"78 or "whether it
fulfills the demand for the original?"77 A fair use may suppress demand but may not usurp it.78 The supplant/suppress
distinction is in effect a directlindirect test. It is not an infringement to write a bad review which may destroy demand but it
is an infringement if a parody competes in the same market as
the original work. 79 The rationale is that "[t]he copyright laws
are intended to prevent copiers from taking the owner's intellectual property, [citation omitted], and are not aimed at recompensing damages which may flow indirectly from copying."80
b.

Section 117

Section 117 provides another important exception in the
area of computer programs. 81 Section 117 allows the owner of
a copyrighted computer program to make or authorize the
72. "[O]nce a copyright holder establishes with reasonable probability the existence of a causal connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this damage would have occured had
there been no taking of copyrighted expression." 1d. at 567 (quoting 1 Nimmer §
1.10[D], at 1-87).
73. "[T]o negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
74. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (construing, Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980».
75. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in original). "If the intended use is for
commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated." 1d.
76. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983).
77. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,438 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. Mere injury is not determinative. The copy must compete, not just have the
potential to destroy the market. 1d.
79.1d.
80. Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir.
1984), rehearing denied, 730 F.2d 47 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
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making of a copy or adaptation as "an essential step in the utilization of the computer program"82 or for archival purposes. 83
The alienability of these copies of adaptations is restricted;
copies may be sold along with a sale of the entire program,84 but
adaptations may only be sold with the permission of the copyright holder.86
Program owners may copy or adapt "as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine. "88 Portions of computer programs are routinely copied into memory in the course of running the program. Some courts have narrowly construed section 117,
holding it only authorizes such copies. 87 Subsequently it has
been held "section 117 should be given a broader reading
where the owner of a copy of a computer program adapts it
for his own internal use. "88 Among the explicitly mentioned
examples of permissible adaptation is the addition of new features. 89 This explicit recognition of the right to add features
was initially accompanied by a substantial caveat, "the
adaptation must be necessary to allow use of the program for
the purpose for which it was purchased. "90 This restriction
was rejected by the Court of Appeals in Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Limited. 91
82. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1).
83. 17 U .S.C. § 117(2).
84. "Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in
the program." 17 U.S.C. § 117.
85. "Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of
the copyright owner." 1d.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1).
87. See Apple Computerv. Formula Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). MicroSparc Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984).
88. RAV Comms. v. Phillip Bros., No. 88 Civ. 3366 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (WESTLAW
36174, 36177, Allfeds directory). In coming to this conclusion the court distinguished
Apple Computer and Micro·Sparc as applying in the context of "schemes to allow unrestricted duplication of computer programs for distribution to third parties.·
89. 1d. at 36177 (citing CONTU Final Report). The CONTU Final Report is
regarded as an expression oflegislative intent by the courts. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Micro-Sparc Inc. v. Amtype Corp.,
592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984); Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp.
1006 (D. Kan. 1989».
90. 1d. at 36177.
91. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). "Section 117(1) contains no language to suggest
that the copy it permits must be employed for a use intended by the copyright owner,
and, absent clear congressional guidance to the contrary, we refuse to read such
limiting language into this exception." 1d. at 261.
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A lessor restriction was adopted in Foresight Resources
Corp. u. Pfortmiller 92 which dictated the right to adapt could
only be used so long as the interests of the copyright holder
were not harmed. 93 Foresight reasoned a broad construction of
section 117 fulfilled CONTU's intent, followed judicial trends,s'
and served important copyright goals. 9s

Foresight also addressed computer program owners authorizing adaptations. The court concluded that "section 117
should not be restricted to prohibit owners from authorizing
custom-made enhancements to their copies of copyrighted programs."96 If computer program owner could not authorize third
parties to enhance their programs then the right would be
illusory for the great majority of computer user because they
lack the ability to make such adaptations themselves. 97
The confusion surrounding distinctions between computer
programs, the audiovisual works they produce, and the copyrightability of each becomes critical in the section 117 arena.
Section 117's application is limited to computer programs and
thus strictly speaking does not authorize adaptation or
enhancement of audiovisual works. 98 The right to adapt the
underlying computer program could once again be rendered
illusory if resulting changes to the audiovisual work produced
are held to be copyrightinfringements. This issue has not yet
been directly addressed by the courts.
III.
A.

OPINION OF THE COURT
THE FACTS

This case considered the interaction the Nintendo
Entertainment System (hereinafter "NES"), Nintendo game
cartridges and the Galoob Game Genie.
92. 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989) [hereinafter Foresight].
93. [d. at 1009.
94. [d. (endorsing e.g.,Yault Corp., 847 F.2d 255j RA V Comms., No. 88 Civ. 3366
(WESTLAW at 36177, Allfeds directory».
95. "[A]llowing sophisticated software users to enhance copies of copyrighted
programs they have purchased eliminates the need to choose between either buying the
latest version of a program or possibly infringing the program's owner's copyright. At
the same time, allowing such enhancements to be used only in-house preserves the market for improvements made by the copyright holder: Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010.
96. [d. at 1010.
97. [d. In doing so the Foresight court explicitly contradicted earlier cases holding it to be contributory infringement for a third party to adapt a computer program
for the owner of the program.ld. at 1009. Such a holding would put the right to adapt
computer programs beyond the grasp of the great majority of computer program
owners. [d. at 1010.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 117. See also Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012.
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The Nintendo Entertainment System

The NES consists of a microprocessor99 based "Control
Deck" which connects to a home television or monitor. The
Control Deck consists essentially of a central processing unit
(CPU) controlling the system's operation and a picture processing unit (PPU) which controls the display to the
television. 100
The NES games cartridges consist of Read Only Memory
chips containing the computer program and the audiovisual
works. IOI The game cartridge is plugged into the Control Deck
which displays the audiovisual work on a television. l02 Players
interact with the game through the use of provided control pads
or accessories such as joysticks. 103 The cartridges contain a "program memory" which is processed through the CPU and a
"character memory" which processed through the PPU.I04
Nintendo has produced hundreds of games for use with
the NES system. 106 Sixty-three companies are licensed to produce compatible games, another eight companies produce
games without a license. lOS In total more than 500 hundred
games have been produced for use with the NES.l07
Games typically involve a character operating in a world in
which he must overcome obstacles, fight battles, and determine
the optimal route through the various levels of the world while
working toward the ultimate goal of finishing the game before
losing a set number of lives. 108

2.

The Game Genie

The Game Genie is designed to be inserted in between a
game cartridge and the NES Control Deck. 109 The game is first
99. Defined as a semiconductor central processing unit usually contained on a .
single integrated circuit chip. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 565 (1984). In anthropomorphized terms, the brain of the computer.
100. Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149826, Allfeds directory).
101. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. [d.
105. [d. Nintendo's early games, including many at issue in the present case, are
copyrighted both as computer programs and as audiovisual works. As noted earlier the
copyright office will now only accept a single application for each computer program.
106. [d.
107. [d.
108. [d.
109. [d. at 149829.
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plugged into the Game Genie and then the Game Genie is
plugged into the Control Deck. Galoob describes the Game
Genie as a "video game enhancer."l1o Its only function is to
interact with the NES and compatible games. 111
The Game Genie operates in the following manner. The programming phase starts upon pushing the start button on the
Control Deck with the appearance of the Game Genie set-up
screen which allows the player to input up to three wishes. 112
The player then presses the select button and the normal
opening screen for the game appears and the game proceeds as
modified by the Game Genie. 113
Galoob provides a booklet, the "Programming Manual and
Code Book" containing over 1600 wishes. ll' Each wish is accompanied by a code which is input during the programming phase
in order to effect the corresponding wish. The Code Book
encourages players to use these codes and to experiment to find
new codes. 116 The codes result in a variety of effects such as providing more or fewer lives, starting at advanced levels, skipping certain obstacles etc. llS Players can connect multiple
Game Genies together and enter more codes, i.e., 2 Game
Genies will accept up to 6 codes.
The Game Genie functions by intercepting requests from the
CPU to the computer program and inserting a different value
than the one contained in the computer program on the game cartridge or by accessing a different area of the computer program.
The Game Genie is marketed for use by consumers as an
accessory to their NES.117 It can only be used in conjunction with
the NES. It has no independent purpose, and cannot take the
place of a game cartridge· or make a duplicate. Any effects
last only so long as power is not interrupted or play reset. 118 The
codes Will not alter the plot, theme or characters of the game. 119
110. Nintendo Complaint For Copyright and Trademark Infringement at 4,
Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, Allfeds directory).
'111. Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149829, Allfeds directory).
112. 1d.
113. 1d.
114. 1d. at 149830.
115. 1d.
116. 1d.
117. 1d.
118. 1d.
119. 1d.
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The game cartridge is not altered in any way, and may be
played normally by disconnecting the Game Genie and reinserting the game cartridge into the Control Deck. 120

3.

Nintendo Accessories and Publications

Nintendo markets accessories such as the NES Advantage
which alter game play in ways similar to the Game Genie. 121
Nintendo also publishes Nintendo Power Magazine which provides lists of secret codes which effect modifications similar to
the Game Genie's, including the ability to skip levels and gain
extra lives. m

B.

THE HOLDINGS

The court made two substantive holdings: 123 1) Use of the
Game Genie by consumers to temporarily alter copyrighted
video games for their own enjoyment does not create a derivative work under Title 17 United States Code Section 101.
Because the consumers are not direct infringers, Galoob is
not a contributory infringer, 2) In the alternative, even if the
Game Genie did create a derivative product, the doctrine of
"fair use" enables consumers to use the Game Genie for their
personal enjoyment, Title 17 United States Code Section 107,
and therefore allows Galoob to sell it.
1.

The Game Genie does not create a derivative work.

The court first analyzed Nintendo's claim that the Game
Genie creates derivative works, a right which is given exclusively to the copyright holder.124 Nintendo contended the Game
Genie allowed home users to make "elaborations or other modifications, which, as a whole represent an original work of
authorship. "125
.

Galoob first noted that Midway stated the derivative work
definition of section 101 had to be stretched to accommodate
120. [d.
121. [d. at 149839. The NES Advantage provides slow motion play and extra fire
power, making game play easier. [d.
122. [d.
123. [d. at 149826.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
125. Nintendo's Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion For a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 10, Galoob, No. 901586 & 90-1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, Allfeds directory).
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speeded-up video games 128 and then distinguished Midway as
having been decided upon an equitable determination that
the speed-up kit was yielding revenue to the licensee arcade
owner which should have accrued to the copyright holder. 127 In
contrast, the court noted, the Game Genie. is used for "noncommercial, private enjoyment. "128
The court then sidestepped the issue of whether enhanced
video games in general were derivative works by holding the
Copyright Act and the policies behind it made "inherent in the
concept of a "derivative work" [] the ability for that work to exist
on its own, fixed and transferable from the original work, i.e.,
having a separate "form.""129 The Game Genie temporarily
modified but did not create a fixed independent work. As a
result the Game Genie did not satisfy the definition of a derivative work. 130

2.

The Game Genie Qualifies for Protection as a Fair Use.

After supplying a background of the fair use privilege the
court considered each of the section 107 factors in turn. 131 In
doing so the court considered the fairness of the family's use of
the Game Genie with their video game, not the fairness of
Galoob marketing a product to enhance Nintendo games. 132
a.

Purpose and Character

Noting a legislative and judicial reluctance to "carry copyright enforcement into the home," and analogizing to the use
126. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1014. The court first stated it was not obvious from the
language of section 101 that a speeded up video game was a derivative work, analogizing to a speeded up phonograph which it held probably was not a derivative work.
127. See Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149829, Allfeds directory).
"The [Midway] result appeared to be based on the equities of the situation ....
Midway'S result, if not its analysis, appears to have turned on the fact that the
licensee arcade owner, not the copyright holder, was making money from the public
performance of the altered game ...." [d.
128. "Any modification is for the consumer's own enjoyment in the privacy of the
home." [d. at 149832.
129. [d.
130. [d. at 149833.
131. [d. at 149833-35.
132. [d. at 149833. "Fair use is a privilege against a direct infringement claim
17 U.S.C. § 107, and is a privilege held in the first instance by the alleged direct
infringer-i.e., by the person playing the video game. Just as application of the fair
use doctrine in Sony resulted in substantial economic gain for Sony and other VCR
manufacturers, the fair use doctrine applied to this case will benefit Galoob. Sony
makes clear, however, that it is the fairness of the family's use of its video game, not
some evaluation of the commercial "fairness· of Galoob's product, that must guide the
Court's analysis.· [d.
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of VCRs to time shift television programs for home enjoyment, the court found that "a family's use of a Game Genie for
private home enjoyment must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity."133 The noncommerical character of
the family use of the Game Genie established a presumption
of fair use. 134
b.

Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Nintendo has published millions of copies of its games and
freely sells them to anyone willing to pay.186 The Game Genie
can only be used in conjunction with one of these published
copies and thus the Game Genie user must first purchase the
published Nintendo game. 186 Noting the unpublished nature of
the excerpts at issue in Harper & Row 187 had been a "critical element," the court found the published nature of the Nintendo
games supported a finding of fair use. 138
c.

Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

Holding the Sony decision to be dispositive the court found
the incorporation of entire Nintendo games did not weigh
against a finding of fair use. 139 In Sony the viewers had been
invited to watch the entire television program free of charge. 140
The Nintendo games had to be purchased so the owner was
entitled to use the entire work. W "Because the game owner is
entitled to use the entire work, no matter what the "amount and
substantiality" of his use, the third factor cannot ... overcom[e]
the presumption of fair use. "142
d.

Effect on the Market

Applying the suppress/supplant distinction the court found
that even widespread use of the Game Genie could not supplant
demand for the games because the Game Genie can only be
operated in conjunction with a game cartridge. l43
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149834, Allfeds directory).
[d.
[d.
[d.

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149834, Allfeds directory).
[d. at 149835.
Sony, 417 U.S. at 449.
Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149835, Allfeds directory).
[d.
[d.
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Nintendo failed to show any reasonable likelihood it would
market slightly altered games t « or that it might wish to rerelease altered versions of the game in the future. t46
Nintendo also failed to show the Game Genie would harm
sales of Nintendo gameS. 14e A consumer study of the Game
Genie done in Canada, Nintendo's inability to provide empirical evidence of harm, and an expert witness led the court to
conclude that if anything the use of video games would increase
as a result of the Game Genie. l "
e.

Summary

The noncommercial nature of the use of the Game Genie
within the home creates a presumption of fair use. t48 The published nature of the video game and the right of the game
owner to use the entire game weigh in favor of fair use. 149
Nintendo failed to show injury. 160 Therefore, even if the Game
Genie produces a derivative work, players would be shielded
from a direct infringement claim by the doctrine of fair use, cutting off any contributory infringement claims. 161
IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

THE HOLDINGS

1.

The Game Genie does not create a derivative work.

Galoob significantly refines the definition of derivative
word by explicitly requiring a derivative work have a separate,
fixed and transferable, form. 162
Galoob purports to distinguish Nintendo's authority by
distinguishing Midway as involving a licensee reaping profits
which should have accrued to the copyright holder and thus dissimilar from a consumer using the Game Genie for private
enjoyment. 163 In doing so the court declined to address Worlds
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
[d.
Id.
Id.

at 149836.
at 149837.
at 149838.
at 149842.
at 149843.
at 149833.
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of Wonder which Nintendo cited in support of its position that
the Game Genie created a derivative work. 164
Worlds of Wonder cannot be distinguished in the same
fashion because Veritel's cassettes altered a product to be
used in the home in a fashion very similar to the Game Genie,
i.e., the consumer used the cassettes for noncommercial, private enjoyment. ISG Further, Veritel and Galoob can both fairly
be characterized as trying to ride the coattails of another's
success.
Worlds of Wonder can be distinguished because the Veritel
tapes constituted a fixed, transferable work. The Veritel cassettes were a separately marketable item producing a fixed
audiovisual display when inserted in the Teddy Ruxpin bear. 166
The Game Genie does not produce a fixed audiovisual display, it enables the video game owner to make a plethora of
modifications at their discretion.
Arguably, Worlds of Wonder was incorrectly decided. The
implication of finding that any tape which could operate in the
Teddy Ruxpin bear was a derivative work is that the bear
itself constituted the most important part of the audiovisual
work. An alternate view would be that the tape contains the
audiovisual work and the bear is merely a mechanical vehicle
for the presentation. This could be compared to a normal tape
player and the music on the tape cassettes. Arguably Veritel
created a new audiovisual work to displayed through Worlds
of Wonder's vehicle.
This alternate interpretation would better serve the purpose
of copyright law. Worlds of Wonder would still be able to protect its own tapes but could not prevent others from providing
alternate works for public consumption. The Worlds of Wonder
decision leaves open the possibility of new technologies being
restricted to one company.167
154. Nintendo's Amended Memorandum of Law in Support oC Its Motion For a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary lI\iunction at 12, Galoob, No. 90·1586
& 90·1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826, AllCeds directory).
155. See Worlds of Wonder, 658 F. Supp. at 351.
156. [d.
157. Consider the inventor of a new technology such as CDs marketing a few
albums and then claiming anyone else's CDs are derivative works. Such technology
is more appropriately dealt with under patent law. This encourages the develop.
ment of technology and promotes its exploitation once developed.
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Galoob makes an appropriate and logical refinement of
the definition of derivative work, furthering the purpose of
copyright law. The protection afforded derivative works is
provided in a construction parallel to the rights to make or distribute copies, or display or perform a work. 158 Implied in each
is the concept of a distinguishable work. Similarly, the examples provided in the definition 159 all possess a separate form
from the original work and are able to exist separately.
This linguistic approach is supported by a broader examination of the construction and purpose of copyright protection.
Copyright law functions by affording the copyright holder an
economic incentive in order to stimulate innovation. This is
done to serve the public. The protections afforded, i.e., limited monopolies, are generally repugnant and are only afforded
so long as they serve to stimulate innovation and do not overburden the dissemination of such innovation to the public.
Consider the suppress/supplant distinction of the fair use
doctrine. A work which has no transferable form can never supplant demand for a product, as it cannot compete in the marketplace.

2.

The Game Genie Qualifies for Protection as a Fair Use

The court's analysis of fair use was a straightforward application of the four statutory factors of section 107 as interpreted by Sony. Galoob closely follows the footsteps of Sony,
refusing to extend copyright enforcement into the home. 16o
The arguments of fair use for the Game Genie are in several
ways stronger than for the use of VCR's considered in Sony.
First, the NES and Game Genie are exclusively used in the
home. VCRs are capable of public display of copyrighted works
or copying for distribution, either of which would be definite
copyright infringements not protected by the fair use doctrine. Sony avoided these uses by holding that VCRs were
also used for time-shifting programs. 161 In determining that fair
use was applicable only time-shifting was considered.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 101. (for example translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation).
160. Galoob, No. 90-1586 & 90-1440 (WESTLAW at 149834, Allfeds directory).
161. Sony, 417 U.S. at 442.
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Second, to use the Game Genie a published Nintendo game
had to be purchased. In Sony the viewers had not paid to see
the broadcasts. This ties into the quantity argument. Once the
game was purchased the owner could use itin its entirety as
they saw fit. Having purchased the copyrighted work, the
game' owner's rights were if anything superior to the rights of
the home viewers with regard to the television broadcast.
Last, since the Game Genie must work with a game cartridge, it cannot supplant demand for game cartridges. It can
only alter games, not replace them. In Sony, a strong argument
could have been made that VCRs supplant demand. If a person can only afford to watch television two hours a day switches to watching videotapes, then demand for live broadcasting
has been supplanted.

B.

THE OMITTED HOLDING -

§ 117

Although the issue was extensively briefed,162 Judge Smith
chose not to address the possibility that the adaptations made
by the Game Genie were protected by section 117. There are two
arguments for this being an appropriate decision.
First, the court held the Game Genie did not create derivative works and had then continued with the alternative fair use
holding. An alternative to the alternative would have been
redundant. Second is judicial restraint. Having a firmly rooted area of the law on which to base its decision, it is proper for
courts to avoid reaching issues which need not be decided.
Such a decision is particularly appropriate here where the
authority for the fair use doctrine is the Supreme Court163 as
contrasted with the authority for section 117 which is not
completely settled and stems from lower courts. 1M
Another facet of judicial restraint provides a contravening
principle which indicates that section 117 should have been the
basis of the court's opinion. Where applicable, court's should
apply specific rather than general principles. Section 117 was
162. Galoob's Memorandum in Opposition to Nintendo's Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 17, Galoob, No. 90·1586 & 90-1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (WESTLAW 149826,
Allfeds directory).
163. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
164. Foresight Resources, 719 F. Supp. at 1006; Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 255; RA V
Communications, 1988 W.L. at 36174.
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specifically tailored to limit the exclusive rights of computer
program copyright holders. Since it is specifically addressed to
the problems of copying and altering computer programs, and
because it is the most recent legislative expression on the
subject, it supersedes the more general fair use principles
which would otherwise govern.
1.

§ 117 Makes Use of the Game Genie Non-Infringing

Assuming the Game Genie produces derivative works,
game owners would be protected from a claim of direct infringement by section 117's authorization of computer program adaptations.
At the present time authorities hold section 117 should be
construed broadly165 and have recognized the right to make
adaptations includes the right to add features. l66 While the right
to make adaptations was originally restricted to adaptation necessary to enable the use of the program for the purpose it was
purchased,167 courts no longer consider the reason behind the
adaptations. 16s Arguably the Game Genie fits even the more
restrictive view because it enables less talented or experienced people to enjoy playing video games. The viewpoint to be
considered is the family's. Thus the relevant purpose is family entertainment, not profit for Nintendo.
The fact that the Game Genie was created by a third party
and not the game owners cannot hinder a section 117 defense.
Foresight noted the right to adapt would be illusory to the great
majority of consumers if they could not draw upon the talent
of people capable of adapting computer programs. 169
The weak link in the above argument is that the chronology shows Galoob had no authorization prior to marketing
the Game Genie. This argument falls to the observation that
the video game player, not Galoob makes the adaptations of the
game by inputting the codes, Galoob merely provides the
means by which the average consumer can effectuate the
changes they wish to make.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

RAVComms., No. 88 Civ. 3366 (WESTLAWat 36174, Allreda directory).
[d. at 36177 (citing CONTU Final Report).
[d.
Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 261.
Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010.
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§ 117 is Subsumed by the Fair Use Doctrine

The section 117 exceptions to the exclusive rights granted
the copyright holder are subsumed by the fair use doctrine. In
discussing the application of the four fair use factors to section
117, particular attention will be paid to the right to adapt
granted in section 117(1). A similar examination would reach
the same result with regard to the right to make archival
copies granted in section 117(2).
a.

Purpose and Character

Section 117 prohibits the transfer of adaptations without the
authorization of the copyright owner.170 This forces even similarly situated persons to make their own adaptations. This
eradicates any chance for the adaptations to be used in a commercial fashion, i.e., to supplant demand for the original work.
The adaptations are available only to the owner of the computer
program who made or authorized them. A finding of noncommercial use establishes a presumption of fair use.l7l
b.

Nature of the Copyrighted Work

This "critical element"172 supports a finding of fair use as
well. Section 117 only authorizes the owner of a computer
program to make or authorize adaptations.17s The fact that
people other than the copyright holder own copies of the computer program indicates the work is published.
c.

Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

For arguments sake we must assume a worst case scenario
with regard to amount and presume the entire work is being
used. Use of the entire work formerly carried a presumption
against fair use. 174 Sony narrowed that presumption by excluding from its ambit cases where the alleged infringer was entitled to use the entire work. 176 The owner of a computer program
is entitled to use the entire program with no presumption
against fair use.176
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

17U.S.C. § 117.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
17 U.S.C. § 117(2).
Leon, 91 F.2d at 486.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 449·50.
[d.
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Effect on the Market

The relevant inquiry here is restricted to whether the
adaptation will supplant demand for the copyrighted work. The
user must first own a copy of the program in order to be entitled to make adaptations. The adaptations cannot be transferred without the approval of the copyright holder. The
restrictions eliminate any possibility of the adaptations supplanting demand for the copyrighted work. Thus, this factor
does not weigh against a finding of fair use.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Galoob is a well reasoned, correctly decided opinion which
adds a significant refinement to the definition of a derivative
work and follows the tradition set by the Supreme Court for the
fair use doctrine. A reluctance to pursue copyright infringement
in the home serves the purpose of disseminating innovation
without jeopardizing the innovative incentive.
The court exercised judicial restraint by avoiding issues
which were thoroughly briefed by the parties but which did not
need to be addressed. Doing so avoided discussion of section
117. By following the example set by this case, section 117 need
not ever be addressed by the courts because, as in this case, any
adaptation covered by section 117 would be protected as a
fair use under section 107.
The effect of this example is to circumvent the intention of
Congress. Section 117 was enacted to govern copying and
adapting computer programs. I?? As such, it supersedes the
fair use doctrine in this area and should have been given
effect by the courts. While the Congressional action may have
been redundant in this instance, its intent should be carried
out as best possible.
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